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Introduction
Industrial countries generally allow losses from the sale of capital assets as o¤sets against taxable capital gains. Allowing a portion of any de…cit as a deduction from other income and permiting net losses to be carried forward or back to previous tax years are common tax code rules. 1 Whatever the rules, o¤set provisions reduce tax liability for investors incurring capital losses and encourage risky capital investment. Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) pointed out that partial rather than full loss o¤set provisions might be instituted because of a government's inability to distinguish between consumption and production activities and also could be desirable if individuals were able to in ‡uence relevant states of nature. Auerbach (1986) provided a dynamic analysis of taxation impacts on investment decisions and proposed a number of rationales for asymmetry, including the desire to limit …rms'deduction of …ctional expenses and the wish to discourage operation of unpro…table …rms.
Connections between loss o¤set provisions and behaviour in the face of risk have been well noted in the literature, beginning with the analysis of Domar and Musgrave (1944) . They observed that in the absence of o¤set, tax increases lessen risk-taking. Stiglitz (1969) , using a more general expected utility model, con…rmed the disincentive e¤ect and it has been observed in similar models under various tax scenarios, including those of Mossin (1968) , Feldstein (1969) and Ahsan (1974) . 2 Most studies of this genre had ignored how the public sector would deal with the revenue risk and assumed in e¤ect the state to be risk-neutral. When dealing with capital risks, the latter assumption may well be untenable. Bulow and Summers (1984) and Gordon (1985) have argued that, especially for corporate tax revenue, government need not be any more able to bear risk than the private sector. A key implication is that the costs of and bene…ts from risk-taking remain entirely in the private sector. 3 Early investigations of deadweight loss (DWL) owing to capital income taxation, including work by Boskin (1978) , Feldstein (1978) and Summers (1981) ignored risk. Fullerton and Gordon (1983) and Slemrod (1983) incorporated risk into their analysis by replacing the tax-induced change in 1 The current United States tax code allows up to $3000 per year in capital losses to be written o¤ against other income. Canadian losses in any one year can be applied only against gains. 2 Sandmo (1985) provides a still-relevant review of taxation impacts on savings and risk-taking. 3 In order to accomplish the latter, as detailed in the next section, we assume that tax revenues are returned to each taxpayer in amounts identical to revenues collected. 2 behaviour in Harberger's classic formula by its expected value. Gordon and Wilson (1989) , examining DWL under uncertainty with full loss o¤set, argued that in a dynamic multi-period setting the correct measure was the certainty equivalent of the lottery and concluded that in neglecting risk-aversion, previous studies had over-estimated e¢ ciency costs.
The present analysis employs a simple two-period, two-asset, consumptionsavings model to identify and measure e¢ ciency losses in a risky world, comparing impacts under full and imperfect loss o¤sets. To allow focus on the e¤ects of alternative tax rules we assume that the public sector is no more or less e¢ cient than the private in handling risk, that there is no asymmetric information between individuals and the government, and that all risk is borne by the private sector.
Under these conditions and assuming non-expected utility preferences, we carry out numerical simulations of impacts and welfare costs. Starting from an initial tax rate of forty percent, we determine that under plausible assumptions about investor attitudes towards risk and consumption versus savings, the welfare loss from capital income taxation without o¤set would be substantial, amounting to approximately sixty two cents per dollar of tax revenue or some 18 percent of savings. In contrast, the welfare loss from capital income taxation with full loss o¤set would be approximately fourteen cents per dollar, or just 5 percent of savings.
The contribution of the present research is twofold. First, it presents a framework within which to calculate deadweight losses generated by capital income taxation under alternative o¤set rules and under the plausible rule that all risks remain in the private sector. Second, it examines the impacts that attitudes towards risk and consumption substitutability each have on tax-induced behaviour, and thence on welfare, under a given o¤set regime. In each case, simulations are employed to demonstrate outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II models investor decision-making. Section III uses non-expected utility preferences to value the deadweight loss from distortions owing to capital income taxation. Section IV evaluates outcomes when capital asset selling prices, and hence tax revenues, are risky. Section V examines the sensitivity of DWL to alternative parameter values and distribution assumptions. Section VI concludes. Much of the technical derivation is relegated to the Appendix.
The Portfolio -Savings Decision
Consider an individual who works in the …rst period and earns a non-stochastic wage income Y 1 . The household allocates this income to current consumption, denoted by C 1 , and savings, S 1 . Savings, S 1 , can be invested in a risky asset a 1 , and a riskless investment m 1 in order to provide consumption for retirement. Thus in the …rst period:
In the second period, the safe asset yields an after tax return of (1 )r where is the tax on capital income and r the before tax return per unit of investment. The state of nature i determines the return of the risky asset, x 2i . A good and a bad state of nature are modeled. In the good state of nature, the risky asset yields an after tax return x 2g (1 ) > 0 with probability p and in the bad state of nature x 2b (1 ' ) < 0 with probability (1 p) per unit of investment. 4 The parameter 0 ' 1 indicates the level of o¤set provision. Full loss o¤set (FLO) occurs when ' = 1. When FLO is in e¤ect, the household pays x 2g in taxes per unit of investment if the good state of nature occurs and is allowed a loss o¤set in the bad state of nature equal to x 2b . In the case of no loss o¤set (NLO), ' = 0; the household still pays x 2g in taxes in the good state of nature but is not allowed to o¤set any losses if the bad state materilizes. A second period stochastic lump-sum transfer from the state, denoted by G 2i is also provided.
During retirement the households consumes C 2b if the bad state of nature materializes and C 2g if the good state occurs.
The household's preferences are described by the class of non-expected utility preferences as formulated in a two period setting by Selden (1978, 79) . These preferences include the corresponding expected cardinal utility function as a special case. The household is assumed to make choices between current and certainty equivalent future consumption, CE(C 2 ). The preferences are: 6 4 Limited liability requires that x 2b > 1. 5 There are no bequests in the model. 6 See Selden (1978, 79) 
where the consumer's rate of time preference is re ‡ected in the discount factor = 1=(1+ ) with measuring the rate of time preference and the intertemporal substitutability between current and certainty equivalent future consumption is measured by = . The certainty equivalent of future consumption is given as follows:
where, is the relative relative risk averson parameter measuring aversion to risk taking activity. 7 The household computes the certainty equivalent future consumption given its risk preferences, and then relying on the intertemporal substitutability combines current consumption with the certainty equivalent future consumption.
For a given G 2i , the …rst-order condition with respect to the choice of current consumption is:
The household sets the marginal utility of current consumption equal to the future value of the marginal utility of future consumption adjusted for its risk preference. Turning to the …rst order condition with respect to risk taking:
where z 2 is the after tax excess return of the risky asset relative to the safe asset. In the good state of nature z 2g = (x 2g r)(1 ) > 0, while in the bad state of nature z 2b = (x 2b (1 ' ) (1 )r) < 0. Equation (6) states that at the optimum the expected marginal gain from risk taking is equal to that of the riskless investment in terms of their contribution to future consumption. 7 The utility function takes on the familiar von-Neumann Morgenstern form when 1 = . Risk neutral constant elasticity of inter-temporal substitution preferences (RINCE) developed by Farmer (1990) is observed when = 0.
8 An interior solution obtains so long as the expected return on the risky asset exceeds the return on the riskless investment.
Since it is assumed that the government is no more (or less) e¢ cient in handling risk we assume that tax revenue is returned to the taxpayer in the amount identical to revenues collected. This implies that the risk remains within the private sector, and hence investors ultimately bear the entire risk. Gordon justi…es such an assumption as follows:
"Given that the government absorbs a sizable fraction of the risk as a result of the taxes on corporate income, one might have expected the market risk premium to fall. However, the government cannot freely dispose of the risk it bears. Individuals must ultimately bear this risk, whether through random tax rates on other income, random government expenditures, or random government de…cits" (1985, p5).
Thus given optimal choices with taxes and o¤set provisions, the government transfers:
where
is precisely the tax paid by a typical individual. Under this assumption appendix 1 derives the explicit optimal values of asset choice and consumption decision. The optimal values are presented below in a general form:
The optimal values of consumption and risky asset holdings are linear functions of the individual's endowment, Y 1 . Appendix 2 proceeds to derive the optimal response of current consumption and risky asset to an increase in capital income taxation assuming all risk remain with the private sector. The responses are as follows:
These two expressions measure the expected change in current consumption due to a change in the tax rate and that of the risky asset under the assumption of no risk sharing by the government (NRS). 10 Current consumption is encouraged, while at the same time risky asset chioce is discouraged, because the increase in the capital income tax alters the relative price of current and future consumption distorting intertemporal decisions (i.e., see equation 5 which still holds). In the case of imperfect loss o¤set, risky asset holdings are discouraged even more because the relative asset returns are also distorted (i.e., see equation 6). The return of the stochastic tax revenue back to the household eliminates all income e¤ects and only substitution e¤ects remain. Taxation has no stimulating e¤ects on risk taking activity. .
The Deadweight Loss of Capital Income Taxation
The stochastic lump sum rebate of taxes paid would not be su¢ cient to hold the investor on the same indi¤erence level as prior to the imposition of the tax, because the capital income tax would entail an e¢ ciency loss by creating a distortion in the inter-temporal price of future consumption as well as to the assets' after tax returns given partial loss o¤set provisions. In what follows we use the Diamond-McFadden (1974) approach to measuring the marginal deadweight loss (MDL) of capital income taxation, which quanti…es the additional income (consumption in our case) required by the investor in the current period in order to remain just as well o¤ after the tax increase and the consequent transfer payment. MDL is equal to
where L 1 is the additional consumption needed in the …rst period to make the household indi¤erent to the tax increase. Appendix 3 shows the MDL as follows: 10 In an important extension, Gordon and Wilson (1989) argue that in a multi-period context riskiness in future decision variables cannot be measured merely by the expected value. The correct procedure would be to use the certainty equivalent of the tax-induced change in Xi. However, in the present context, all decisions are made in the current period, and hence, are una¤ected by future risk considerations.
7
The MDL is equal to the value of the tax outstanding per unit of the i-th activity multiplied by the change in the i-th activity due to the tax change.
11
MDL is positive (
> 0 and with imperfect loss o¤set provisions the second term is also positive given that x 2b < 0 as well as
12 The value of the tax outstanding per unit of consumption activity is measured by the term r (1+r (1 )) and that of a risky asset choice by the term (1+r(1 )) . For the former, the quantity (r ) is precisely the amount of tax paid on a unit of risk-less investment. This is entirely consistent with the approach of Gordon and Wilson, who explained that the "the size of the tax distortion is the same on each asset, and can be measured most simply by the taxes paid on the riskless investment" (Gordon and Wilson, p427).
The term
re ‡ects the distortion in the relative asset return that is associated with the partial loss o¤set provision of the tax code. The value of tax outstanding is equal to zero under full loss o¤set provision and negative under partial loss o¤set provisions. With full loss o¤set provisions there is no deadweight loss associated with the portfolio choice since the value of the tax outstanding per unit of the risky activity is equal to zero. With full loss o¤set provisions the deadweight loss consists only of the …rst right-hand term in equation (10) . Furthermore, under full loss o¤set provisions it is the elasticity of substitution that establishes the existence of deadweight loss due to capital income taxation (given a non-zero EIS) as in the case of certainty. The relative risk aversion determines the magnitude and not the direction of the DWL …gure under full loss o¤set provisions. In the more general case of partial loss o¤set provisions both the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution and the attitude towards risk play important roles.
The M DL measure above does not take into account the incremental revenue raised from an increase in capital income taxation (M T R =
@T R @
). In order to adjust the M DL for M T R, the Marginal cost of public funds (M CF ) expression is used which is given by:
13 11 This measure of the marginal e¢ ciency cost of capital income taxation under uncertainty is related the one derived by Arnold Harberger (1971) . He expressed DWL as the product of a tax distortion term and a quantity measuring the tax-induced change in behaviour. The Harberger measure was developed under conditions of certainty, and later authors have interpreted the measure as applicable to behaviour under uncertainty by qualifying the tax-induced change in behavior by its expected value. The parallel between our result and that of the traditional Harberger formula is made transparent in what follows in the text. 12 MDL will be negative if the government is more e¢ cient in handling risks than the private sector, leading to a marginal welfare bene…t.
By increasing marginally the capital income tax rate, additional revenue is raised to …nance public expenditures (i.e., M T R) but this increase also results in an additional cost, in terms of e¢ ciency (i.e., M DL). Thus the M CF is the e¢ ciency cost (in cents) of raising a dollar of revenue through distortionary taxation beyond that of the dollar being raised. If M DL = 0 then this ratio is 1. This would be valid if we had included lump sum taxes in the model. If M DL > 0, as is the case in this model, this ratio is greater than unity.
Revenue Valuation
In this section, an expression for M T R is provided which is consistent with the no risk sharing assumption. We argue that under uncertainty, the M T R =
@CE(T R) @
is the additional value (certainty equivalent) of the tax revenue raised by increasing marginally the capital income tax. To be consistent with the assumption that the government is just as e¢ cient in handling aggregate risk as the private sector the standard security market line of the capital asset pricing model developed by Lintner (1965) , Mossin (1966) and Sharpe (1964) is used to value the tax revenue.
14 Assume that the government issues securities that have a claim on (7a) and (7b) as reproduced below:
is precisely the tax paid by a typical individual. The market value of the above stochastic revenue ‡ow would be equal to:
where z 2m is the after tax excess return of the market portfolio, cov(G 2 ; z 2m ) is the covariance of the revenue ‡ow with the excess return of the market portfolio and var(z 2m ) is the variance. The second part of (13) is the risk premium of the uncertain tax revenue ‡ow as determined by the asset pricing model. Substituting in (13) the lump sum transfer and after simple manipulations yields:
where E(z 2 ) = p(x 2g r) + (1 p)('x 2b r) is the pre-tax excess return of the household's portfolio. The certainty equivalent of the tax revenue from capital income taxation is equal to the tax revenue generated from risk free interest on total savings, i.e., r(Y C 1 ). The certainty equivalent of the tax revenue generated from the excess return held by the household is zero. 15 The excess return of the security held by the investor is equal to
according to the security market line. Thus the market value of the revenue stream from the excess return equals zero. The market prices all investments. As a result the government's …nancial assets, which have a claim on the revenue of the excess returns, is of no value to the market because the claim does not o¤er to the investor any additional diversi…cation possibilities other than those already o¤ered by the market. Therefore, the additional revenue raised in the second period is:
Substituting the present value of (16) into (11) results in:
The loss is the smallest when there is full loss o¤set provisions since the second term in the numerator is absent in this case. MCF increases as loss o¤set provisions are removed. The next section provides a numerical illustration of the magnitude of the deadweight loss of capital income taxation under various parameter values.
Numerical Simulations
The parameters of the model are largely based on empirical regularities. In addition some extreme cases are examined. The relative risk aversion parameter is assumed to vary between 0 (risk neutrality) to a maximum of value of 4.
16 A zero RRA value will give results for a risk neutral agent whose behaviour is governed by RINCE preferences developed by Farmer (1990) . A risk neutral investor is seen to allocate the entire savings to the (on average) higher yielding risky asset. She is also allowed to borrow the safe asset. The other extreme occurs when the relative risk aversion of an investor is at the other end of the spectrum in which case she invests all savings in the safe asset. Under this case the investor would still choose the consumption stream based on the inter-temporal rate of substitution. The welfare results in this latter case will correspond to the two period model life cycle model under certainty (eg, Feldstein, 1978) . The elasticity of substitution is allowed to vary between 0.00 and 2.5.
The distribution of the asset returns is as follows. The value of the safe return is assumed to be 50 percent over a life cycle of say 25 years, which would translate to an annual compounded rate of return of 1.64 percent. This annual rate closely corresponds to the real yield on long government bonds. The rate of return of the risky asset is chosen initially to yield an average real annual rate of 5.80 percent, which is slightly higher than the real return on the S & P 500 index of approximately 5.17 percent over the past forty years. The probability of the good state of nature is set at 80 percent. The good state of nature yields an annual return of return equal to 6.6 percent, while the bad state of nature yields an annual loss of approximately 2.7 percent. The tax rate is set initially at 40 percent.
Numerical simulations follow. Figure 1 presents the marginal tax revenue generated by increasing the capital income tax rate under the assumption of full loss-o¤set provision. Figure 2 illustrates the no loss-o¤set provision.
MTR under loss o¤set is above the no loss o¤set function under the same relative risk aversion and EIS parameters. Thus the government is not capable of generating more additional revenue by imposing loss o¤set restrictions.
This phenomenon arises because under no loss o¤set provision savings are more severely discouraged than in the case of loss o¤set. Furthermore, MTR increases with the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, more so for low levels of risk aversion parameter. Holding the elasticity of substitution constant (and less than unity), MTR increases the with relative risk aversion parameter. In the case where the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity MTR declines as relative risk aversion parameter increases.
MCF ranges from the value of 1 to a maximum of 1.25 approximately. 17 Figure 3 indicates that the largest MCF occurs for a person with the highest elasticity of substitution and the highest risk aversion parameter. For a representative investor with an elasticity of substitution of 1.67 and a relative risk aversion of around 2, the e¢ ciency cost would equal fourteen cents to a dollar of revenue raised.
MCF varies with respect to EIS and RRA values. With respect to EIS, MCF falls as the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution decreases for risk aversion parameters greater than unity. However, for an individual that has a relative risk aversion less than unity, the losses peak at an inter-temporal elasticity of substitution greater than unity and then fall continuously as EIS falls.
With respect to risk aversion, MCF rises as RRA increases when the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity. MCF falls as RRA increases when the elasticity of substitution is less than or equal to unity. With a very high value of 4 for the relative risk aversion, individuals hold most of the entire fund in the safe asset, MCF is equal to 1.15 given an elasticity of inter-temporal substitution of 1.67. For the same inter-temporal substitution value, the MCF drops to 1.10 given risk neutrality. Thus under full loss o¤set provisions, the less risk averse an investor is, the lower the e¢ ciency cost of capital income taxation for a given EIS. Figure 4 below presents the results under the other extreme assumption of having no loss o¤set provisions. 18 Under no loss o¤set the less risk averse an investor is, the higher the e¢ ciency cost of capital income taxation.
The welfare losses range from a value of unity to a maximum of 2.48 within the given range. Under no loss o¤set, the welfare loss is highest for a person that combines a high elasticity of inter-temporal substitution but is not very averse to risk taking activity. For example, a person with an elasticity of substitution of 1.67 and a relative risk aversion parameter of 0.5 will have a welfare loss equal to $2.48 for every dollar of revenue raised. But a risk aversion parameter of 2 results in a welfare loss of capital income taxation equal to $1.62. Contrasting this latter example with the case of full loss o¤set provision, the welfare loss under no loss o¤set increases by a magnitude of forty-eight additional cents to the dollar of revenue raised. 19 Finally, Figure 5 shows the deadweight losses for a representative agent with an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 1.67 and a relative risk aversion parameter of 2 over various tax rates and loss o¤set levels. As expected, the deadweight losses increase with the tax rate and with less provision to loss o¤sets. The DWL are at a minimum when there is full loss o¤set provisions and the capital income tax rate is as low as possible. This paper has investigated deadweight losses stemming from capital income taxation in a two period model, comparing the impacts of complete and incomplete loss o¤set provisions. Key assumptions are that all risk remains within the private sector and that non-expected utility preferences prevail. The results indicate that capital income taxation under less than full loss o¤-set deters risky investment activity and adds substantially to the ine¢ ciency of taxing capital income.
E¢ ciency cost estimates without loss o¤set, under plausible assumptions about attitudes towards risk and time preference and given an initial capital income tax rate of forty percent, were shown to be on the order of sixty two cents per dollar of tax revenue. In contrast, under the same attitudes towards consumption and risk but with full loss o¤set, the dead weight loss was approximately fourteen cents per dollar of revenue raised.
In the absence of loss o¤set, e¢ ciency costs are found to be greatest where agents have a low relative risk aversion and a high elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. With loss o¤set provisions in place, the welfare loss is greatest under high relative risk aversion. Finally, deadweight losses are found to increase not only with the tax rate, holding o¤set provisions constant, but also inversely with loss o¤set levels at any given tax rate.
Future research might fruitfully explore the consequences of asymmetric information between the government and investors, of the government's being more (or less) e¢ cient in the handling risk than the private sector, and of extending the analysis to a multi-period decision framework. Given the preference structure:
and the constraints:
Maximization of A1:1 with respect to current consumption (C 1 ), and the amount invested in the risky asset (a 1 ) yields the …rst order conditions 5 and 6 in the main text.
Utilizing the two states of nature approach these optimal conditions can be re-written as follow:
where r = r(1 ). Using A1:6 to solve for C 2g yields:
Inserting A1:7 into using A1:5 and solving for C 1 as a function of C 2g yields:
The following system of equation composed of A1:7 and A1:8 along with the pre-budget constraints can be used to solve for C 1 ; C 2g ; C 2b ; a 1 and m 1 :
After simple manipulations and de…ning B 1 = B 0 (z 2g z 2b )(1 + r) and
while risky asset allocation can be represented as follow:
8.2 Appendix 2. Derivation of
Di¤erentiating A1:9 with respect to the capital income tax yields:
Under full loss o¤set provision . Thus under full loss o¤set provisions, current consumption is stimulated by a tax increase as follow:
The e¤ect gets stronger with increases in EIS ( ). The RRA operates through its in ‡uence on average consumption and savings behavior. However under no loss o¤set current consumption may be discouraged in some cases since there are two opposing e¤ects.
The e¤ect of a tax increase on risky investment activity is given by differentiating A1:10 with rspect to :
This can be simpli…ed further into the following two components:
Risky asset choice is discouraged under full loss o¤set provisions @a 1 @ F LO; N RS = ra 1 (1 + r(1 ))
and even more so under imperfect loss o¤set due to the presence of the the second term in A2:5. The standard measure of marginal deadweight loss is the additional transfer the individual would have to receive in the …rst period to compensate her for the e¤ects of the tax increase. To …nd the deadweight loss of capital income taxation, we di¤erentiate the value function with respect to the tax rate and substitute the …rst-order conditions. The value function is:
where the optimal choices are given in section 8.1 of the appendix and where L 1 represents the …rst period consumption transfer a household would require in order to be as well o¤ as before the capital income tax. Therefore de…ne M DL = @L 1 @ v=c as the marginal deadweight loss. The …rst order condition for consumption allocation given the stochastic lump sum transfer and the …rst period transfer is:
while, that of asset allocation is:
Utilizing the budget constraint after re-distribution of the tax revenue C 2 = (1 + r)(Y 1 C 1 ) + za 1 and di¤erentiating the value function A3:1 with respect to and setting the result equal to zero yields:
After simple manipulation, and utilizing the …rst order conditions the e¢ ciency loss quantity can be written in terms of compensating variation as in the text. 
